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CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR THE REORGANIZATION
OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS
The atmosphere at the present time is rife with proposals
for sweeping changes in the organization and functioning of
the Federal agencies that exercise administrative powers over
persons and property. The President's Committee on Administrative Management, the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law, and the Brookings
Institution in a report to the Senate Select Committee to
Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government, have
contributed far-reaching suggestions since the opening of the
second Roosevelt administration. The proposals of the President's Committee were partially embodied in a bill to carry
out its recommendations, from which, however, the provisions
that bore upon the principal regulatory agencies have since
been eliminated." Bills prepared by the Bar Association committee in 1937 have not been endorsed in detail, but the committee's report has been approved. 2
It is of the highest importance that thinking in the legal
world develop to the point where the professional judgment
upon such proposals as those now made is realistic and, despite
inevitable differences of opinion, becomes genuinely helpful to
legislators and to the people. Great credit is owing to the
individuals and groups that have carried thought and discussion to the stage of producing the suggested measures and
indicating the means of evaluating them.3 There is ground
'A bill, S. 2700, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937), embracing the Committee's proposals with modifications, was introduced by Senator Robinson June 15, 1937. After hearings before the Select Committee on
Government Organization in August, the committee reported favorably
a substitute bill, S. 2970. SEN. REP. no. 1236, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug.
17, 1937). A bill containing further modifications, S. 3331, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938), is now pending before the Senate. H.R. 8202, 75th Cong.,
embracing reorganization but not the civil service and other collateral
recommendations of the President's Committee (which have been embodied in separate bills) and differing slightly in effect from S. 3331,
was passed by the House August 13, 1937. 88 Cong. Rec. 8875.
2(1937) 23 A.B.A.J. 850.
3
See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-Anerican Administrative
Law Theory (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 538.

336

TEXAS LAW REVIEW

for believing that the current consideration of administrative
problems will produce a system of administration that possesses in greater degree than at present the twin qualities of
efficiency in furthering the public interest4 and availability of
the process that really is due' to affected private interests.
It must be confessed, however, that if this end is to be realized
the arid conceptualism which is prominent in all of the documents under review where they deal with governmental regulation,6 must be made to yield to an approach that takes more
careful account of actualities.
The report of the President's Committee, as is well known,
centers upon the problem of the effective management of the
entire executive branch of the Federal Government, rather
than upon the issues raised by the impact of administration
upon private persons and property. The latter, however,
must be considered in administrative management, and the
Committee's suggestions with respect to it constitute some
of the most controversial aspects of its report.
Briefly, the Committee urges that the entire executive
branch of the Government, except for certain "managerial
agencies" to be mentioned presently, shall be gathered into
twelve departments, each headed by a cabinet officer, and that
the President shall have a continuing power to allocate the
various Federal administrative agencies and their functions
among these departments. Thus a formally unified executive
would be created, with the President at its head. He would
be aided by an enlarged staff of executive assistants and there
would be, in addition, a Civil Service Commissioner, replacing
the present Commission, at the head of an all-embracing civil
service system; a more adequate Bureau of the Budget outside
4"The public interest is the standard that guides the administrator in
executing the law.. This is the verbal symbol designed to produce unity,
order, and objectivity in administration." It "is to the bureaucracy what
the 'due process' clause is to the judiciary. Its abstract meaning is
vague but its application has far-reaching effects." HERRING, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936)

23.

BOne of the connections in which "due process of law," as a legal ideal

if not as a constitutional doctrine, will increasingly acquire specific
content, is that of administrative procedure.
AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1917) 217 ff.

See FREUND, STANDARDS OF

6The Brookings report (see note 27 infra,) does not sin in this manner
in dealing with the question of the maintenance of the independence of
the regulatory commissions. Infra2,text at note 28.
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any department; and a permanent National Resources Board
as an over-all planning agency for the Nation. Responsibility
to Congress-aside from that which grows out of the legislative function of making appropriations-would be obtained
through the President and through an Auditor General, replacing the present Comptroller General, whose function of
auditing expenditures would be separated from those of accounting, disbursement, and adjustment of claims. These
would be transferred to the Treasury Department.7
This plan for improved management is rested upon a dual
basis. First, it is said to accord with certain "canons of
efficiency" in administration which have developed from experience in the conduct of large-scale modern organizations,
both public and private. These canons require, among other
things, "the establishment of a responsible and effective chief
executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative management, . . ." and "the systematic organization of

all activities in the hands of a qualified personnel under the
direction of the chief executive; . . ."s

Second, the plan is

based upon a "deliberate design" of the founding fathers
which caused them to place the "executive power of the Government of the United States" in the President "and in the
President alone,"9 thus erecting the unity of the executive
into a constitutional principle.
The foregoing scheme affects the exercise of administrative powers over private persons and property largely because
of its bearing upon the "independent" regulatory commissions,
which exercise important powers of that variety. The report
of the President's Committee includes these agencies among
approximately 100 separately organized "administrations,
boards, commissions, committees, governmental corporations,
7
REpORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (1937).
The 53-page report of the Committee, together with the

President's message transmitting it and the special studies upon which,
in part, it is based, have been published by the Government Printing
Office in a substantial volume.
8
0p. cit. supra.note 7, at 3.
OId. at 1, 31. Whatever may be the historical validity of this proposition of constitutional law, it exerts no compulsion at the present time.
The constitutionality of shielding the independent regulatory commissions from presidential domination has been fully established by
Humphrey's Executor v. U. S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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and authorities" which either "are under the President but
not in a department" or are "totally independent." 0 The
independent regulatory agencies fall into the latter class.
They are a "new and headless 'fourth branch' of the Government"" and hence violate the canonical and constitutional
principle that the executive shall be unified. The former are
so scattered as to make impossible the performance of the
Presidential duty of over-all management.12
The regulatory commissions,:" moreover, suffer from "a conflict of principle involved in their make-up and functions . . .
an internal inconsistency, an unsoundness of basic theory," in
that "they are vested with duties of administration and policy
determination with respect to which they ought to be clearly
and effectively responsible to the President, and at the same
time they are given important judicial work in the doing of
which they ought to be wholly, independent of Executive control."' 4 Because of these several grave deficiencies it is
proposed not only to gather the "independent" agencies into
the twelve departments but at the same time also to segregate
the judicial functions, where they exist, in judicial divisions
which, though nominally within the departments, shall be
free of executive control.
The latter proposal coincides with recommendations which
the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law, approaching the problem of the regulatory
commissions from an entirely different angle, has made in
recent reports to the Association. This committee, according
to its 1937 chairman, was confronted at the outset of its
work in 1933 "by the lack of any administrative tribunal
0

0p. cit. supra note 7, at 31-32.

Id. at 32.
121d at 34.
'aThe "independent

regulatory commissions" embraced within the
Committee's objection are enumerated by Professor Robert E. Cushman
in his study of them, which is appended to the Report of the President's
Committee (op. cit. supra note 7), and from which the Committee draws
many of its ideas. They are: the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the
National Labor Relations Board, the Bituminous Coal Commission, and
the United States Maritime Commission. Op. cit. supra note 7, at 208.
'4Op. cit. supra note 7, at 40.
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before which many questions of controversy between the Federal Government and the citizen could be taken and the lack
of any independent review of the law and the facts of a great
many of such controversies." Therefore it "has devoted the
major part of its time and study since it was organized to
devising some workable means to create a remedy for such
defect; that is, to provide a forum where Administrative Law
could be practiced." 5
The committee, furthermore, took "the traditional separation of governmental powers into executive, legislative, and
judicial powers as its starting point." 8 It has been troubled
because it has found "a considerable amount of commingling
of legislative, executive, and judicial power in the hands of
administrative officers-much of which was necessarywhether in the regular departments and establishments of
the Federal Government or in the independent boards, commissions, authorities and government-owned corporations."17
In order to accomplish a separation of these commingled
powers and to provide a suitable forum for citizens, the committee recommended that, "subject to the successful accomplishment of a segregation of their judicial functions . . .
and with certain exceptions," the independent commissions
"be abolished."18
Subsequently the Bar Association committee has brought
forward two successive proposals for increasing the means
of "independent review" of administrative determinations,
whether within the regulatory commissions or in other
agencies. In 1936 it proposed to set up a Federal administrative court by consolidating the present Court of Claims,
Customs Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and
Board of Tax Appeals.'9 In addition to the present jurisdiction of these bodies, the new court would have exercised reviewing powers in cases of license revocation by regulatory
agencies. 20 It was proposed to extend its jurisdiction in the
' 5 McGuire, A Bill to Provide for the More Expeditious Settlement of
Disputes with the United States (1937) 23 A.B.A.J. 609, n.
'oReport of Special Committee on Administrative Law (1934) 59
A.B.A. REP. 539, at 541.
7McGuire,

loc. cit. supra note 15.

18 0p. cit. supra note 16, at 540.

IoReport of Special Committee on Administrative Law (1936)
B.A.REP. 720.
201d at 746 ff.

61 A.
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future to an undetermined extent, 21 possibly with the ultimate
result of subjecting all "judicial" administrative determinations to its review. That review would have been exercised
in two stages by trial and appellate divisions, 22 subject to
ultimate correction by the Supreme Court in certiorari

proceedings. 23
Because its 1936 proposal was opposed by lawyers who
practice before the present, admittedly satisfactory tribunals, 24 the committee abandoned its recommendation of a
consolidated administrative court and in 1937 advocated the
creation of means for the "independent review" of administrative determinations, wher6 no facilities for such review
are at present provided. These suggested means include
(1) review by the Court of Claims of the legality of such
general regulations of administrative agencies as may be
brought before it by a prescribed procedure25 and (2) intraagency boards for the review of such decisions and orders
as may be appealed to them, subject to limited further review
on appeal to the circuit courts of appeals. 26 The committee's
proposal with respect to review of general regulations goes
beyond the "judicial" aspects of administrative power and
hence breaks new ground.
The Brookings Institution's report to the Senate committee27
deals with the recommendations of the President's Committee
and also with the problem of "independent review" of administrative determinations. As regards the former, after pointing out the inseparability of the "legislative," administrative,
748.
'761.
28Id. at 765. There is a possible constitutional objection to direct
review by the Supreme Court of proceedings that have not previously
been before a constitutional court, as distinguished from a "legislative"
court such as the Court of Claims; for the high Court cannot be saddled
with original jurisdiction. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261
U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281
U.S. 464 (1930). It does, however, entertain appeals from the Court of
Claims at the present time, under the provisions of the Judicial Code,
43 STAT. 939 (1925), 28 U.S.C. §288 (1934).
24
Report of Special Committee on Administrative Law (1937) A.B.A.
211d at
221& at

ADVANcE PRoGRAM, at 185.

at 169, 194 ff., 224.
at 170, 199 ff., 225.
Printed for the use of the Select [Senate] Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
25ld.

26Id.

27

1937.

No. 10:

REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE REGULA-

TION oF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES.
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and "judicial" aspects of the work of the independent commissions, the report states that the issue "boils down, in effect,
to the question of executive domination of . . . large new

fields of public policy versus control over them by independent
authorities. Is it advisable that these social policies be under
the direct control of the party that happens to be in power
. . . or is it wiser to leave them on a more stable, impartial,
non-political basis ?"28 The report prefers the latter alternative,29 although not without specific suggestions for the redistribution of certain of the present regulatory powers. In the
matter of review of administrative decisions it is proposed
both that there shall be "impartial review" within each agency
when individuals are aggrieved by decisions" and that a system of administrative courts be established with, apparently,
a very broad jurisdiction."
The Brookings report also recommends that each regulatory agency be required to "implement" its powers by
enacting detailed general regulations, to serve as advance
notice to affected parties of the legal requirements they must
observe. 32 The Bar Association committee likewise has stressed
the need for making mandatory the exercise of rule-making
powers by the agencies in which they are vested.33
II. THE ISSUES PRESENTED
The reports that have just been outlined present the following issues which are of importance to lawyers: (1) whether
the "independent" federal regulatory agencies should be incorporated into the executive departments of the government,
with departmental control of their "non-judicial" functions;
(2) whether the "judicial" functions of these agencies should
be segregated from the others and entrusted to separate
tribunals which, although nominally within the departments,
would be free of departmental control; (3) the extent to
which there should be "independent review" within the administrative system of (a) general regulations and (b) decisions and orders; and (4) the desirability of mandatory
2

Id. at 94.
at 100.
soflowever, "It is believed that for the present such a review should be
advisory only." Id. at 101.
31Ibid.
29d.

2d. at 98.

33Op. cit. supra note 24, at 169, 186 ff., 224.
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"implementation" of regulatory powers over persons and
property by means of administrative regulations, in contrast
to the gradual development of standards through decisions
and orders.
These issues are broadly presented; but in few instances
does the recommending group put forth legislative proposals
that would translate its views fully into practice. Although
the President's Committee advocates the delegation of power
to the President to absorb the "independent" agencies into
the departments, it is careful to state that it does not intend
to oppose the continued independence of any specific agency,
where there may be sufficient reason for it.34 The limited
scope of the 1936 proposal of the American Bar Association
committee has already been noted. In 1937 the draft bill prepared by this committee was permissive, not mandatory, in
regard to the establishment of intra-agency boards of review. 5
The Brookings report, which concludes with its broad suggestion for review of administrative decisions by an administrative court and for the mandatory exercise of rule-making
functions by regulatory agencies,** emphasizes in earlier pages
the inseparability of "legislative," administrative, and "judicial" functions3 7 and the necessity of working out policies
from case to case in the administration of measures of economic control. 8
The reason for the disparity between opinions and specific
proposals in these reports lies partly, no doubt, in the strategy
of inaugurating sweeping reforms by piecemeal action, but
partly also in the fact that the actual purposes both of discussing the issues and of proposing concrete measures are
practical and not doctrinal and, hence, would not support
thoroughgoing measures, logically devised. Obviously something more than the theories that have been advanced is
required to support proposed legislation. The "canons of
administration" of the President's Committee are not eternal
truths; the theory of the unity of the executive possesses no
inner sanctity despite its alleged origin in the will of the
Fathers; and the principle of the separation of "judicial"
4

0p. cit. supra, note 7, at 38.

350p. cit. supra note 24, at 225.
36

0p. cit. supra note 27, at 98, 101.
Id. at 92.
a8Id at 89.
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functions from others in the work of administrative agencies
is not self-validating. Similarly, it is not axiomatic that persons adversely affected by administrative determinations are
entitled to "independent review" of those determinations.
Such propositions are advanced because there are definite
interests to be served thereby; and however broadly the propositions may be stated, their proponents draw back from urging
their application at the point at which it becomes likely that
the desired interests will not actually be furthered or that
other, more important interests will be impaired. What the
President's Committee wishes passionately to have the United
States achieve is efficient democratic government.89 What the
Bar Association committee has wanted is the protection of
affected private interests. In the pursuit of these ends the
committees advahce their theories, but both tacitly admit that
the application of them must be halted where the balance of
utility swings against them.
General theories have power, however, when it is not clear
where the balance of utility lies-when the data, perhaps,
are lacking or have been overlooked. Then it is that canons
and principles have force for good or ill; for they point
directions, and to follow produces consequences. All of the
reports here being reviewed have pointed directions. Their
authors have not hesitated to assert that the results of following the arrows they have posted would be good. Thus the
President's Committee, warily though it avoided condemning
any specific independent commission to absorption by a department, denounced all of them in forceful language 0 and proposed no restrictions upon the Presidents power to absorb
all of them into departments. The Bar Association committee
and the Brookings Institution stand committed to the review
of administrative determinations by administrative courts
to the utmost extent, notwithstanding the comparative mildness of the measures thus far drafted.
III. JUDGING THE ISSUES

As respects the desirable organization of those governmental agencies that are subject to the President's supervision,
BoThe report is exceedingly well written. It states the case for
effective administration beautifully and concludes with almost a peroration to believers in democracy.
40
0p. cit. supra note 7, at 39-40.

344

TEXAS LAW REVIEW

his Committee has supplied a convincing argument in support
of its demand for unification. Manifestly it is impossible for
an executive to maintain effective contact with more than a
limited number of subordinates, even when he is provided
with an efficient personal staff. Therefore the multitudinous
agencies for whose policies and smooth running he is responsible must be so grouped that their affairs come before
him through' a few individuals who, in turn, are enabled by
similar means to keep sufficiently in touch with the agencies
committed to their charge.
From this thesis there has been no word of dissent in the
literature or at the hearings upon the report of the President's
Committee. The Committee's-assertion, on the other hand,
that the independent regulatory commissions, which now are
answerable to Congress and not to the President, should be
brought under his control, has been sharply challenged. So
effective has this challenge been that even the bill originally
introduced by Senator Robinson to carry out the Committee's
proposals- contained the qualification that the President, in
the exercise of the broad powers conferred upon him, might
not "abolish any of the functions of an independent establishment" or transfer any of its functions to any other agency,
except "routine administrative and executive functions . . .
common to other agencies of the Government, such as the
preparation of estimates of appropriations, the appointment
of personnel and maintenance- of personnel records, the procurement of material, supplies and equipment, the accounting
for public funds, and related matters."4 2
Evidently it was the purpose of the draftsman to subject
only the "housekeeping" functions of the independent establishments" to possible departmental control. At the subsequent hearings 4 it was pointed out, however, that under the
41S. 2700, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937).

§§ 5(b), 5(c).
These establishments are listed in the bill as "the legislative courts
and the United States Board of Tax Appeals, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the National Bituminous Coal Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Securities
Exchange Commission, and the United States Maritime Commission."
44
Hearings before Select Committee on Government Organization on
S. 2700, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937). See note 1 supra.
42Id.
43
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bill as drawn the President might impose internal reorganization upon the independent establishments, and it was asserted
further that control over their own personnel and estimates
was important to their proper functioning.'" The friends of
the Interstate Commerce Commission rallied to its support in
impressive fashion.48 As a result the bill as subsequently
altered entirely exempts the independent establishments from
the powers conferred upon the President. I
One naturally asks how it became known to the President's
Committee that an all-embracing management of the executive branch of the government by the President would be
better for the country than one to which exceptions were
permitted. The only definite suggestions occur in a study, The
Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, by

Professor Robert E. Cushman, which is appended to the Committee's report as one of a number of studies upon which,
presumably, the recommendations of the Committee are based.
Professor Cushman points to two specific fields of regulation in which independent commissions make important
determinations of policy that should, according to him, be
correlated with the President's general policy.48 These fields
are the regulation of railroads by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the enforcement of the anti-trust laws. That
Presidents occasionally have wished to subordinate the policies
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to their own is well
known, and Professor Cushman cites the evidence. That the
anti-trust policies of successive administrations have varied
not
and that the Federal Trade Commission's policy has
always varied in the same manner, is also well known. 49 The
real issue is which policy ought to prevail. Professor Cushman asserts, but does not demonstrate, that it is the President's. Evidently the issue ought to turn upon whether the
45Id at 174, 179.
4

61d.
at 208-255. Shippers, carriers, and state commissions joined in
the defense.
The Board of Governors
ITS. 3331, §2(b), 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (1937).
of the Federal Reserve System is added. H.R. 8202, supra note 1, exempts
the same agencies, except the Board of Tax Appeals, and three others,
"except as to the function of preparing estimates of appropriations."

480p.

cit. supra note 7, at 219-222.

49The lack of correlation between the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission in this field has been stressed before. See
KEER AND MAY, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINEss (1930) 35-38.
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President or an independent agency of presumably expert
character is most likely to evolve policies that will contribute
to the maintenance of a healthy economic system. It is obvious
that in these fields the government fixes the limits within
which business management must plan. It seems clear that
its policy here should have greater stability than is consistent
with dictation by partisan politics and should be more informed than elected officials are likely to make it. It should
possess the wisdom that derives from accumulated experience
and the resistance to group pressure which is bred by independence and technical competence. Compared with these
considerations the mere concept of entire unification of the
executive branch has little to offer.
There will be ample scope for effective direction of the
country's affairs by the executive if the economic basis of
society is stabilized and controlled in the public interest by
responsible, expert agencies, subject to legislative determination of fundamental policies. In fact, there would be more
to achieve by political means in a nation whose economic life
was expertly conducted than in one whose economic affairs
were rendered unstable by non-expert manipulation-assuming ultimate legislative control in both instances.
It would, of course, be caricaturing the conclusions of
Professor Cushman and the recommendations of the President's Committee to assert that their adoption would result
in simple political opportunism in the areas of regulation
now occupied by the independent commissions. There is direct
evidence to the contrary in the manner in which the Department of Agriculture has exercised important authority over
commodities exchanges and the meat industry.50 It is not even
true that "In case the independent boards and commissions
were placed within executive departments, there undoubtedly
would be a strong control established over the sublegislative
and administrative aspects of the regulatory authorities."5 It
is far more likely that the sheer weight of administrative burdens would compel the President and the department heads to
leave these agencies rather severely alone.52 But the danger of
5oOp. cit. supra note 7, at 214; op. cit. supra note 27, at 14.
5
20p. cit. supra note 27, at 51.
-Except in so far as the doctrines of the Supreme Court might compel
personal exercise by these ofters of such regulatory functions as might
nominally be vested in them. See Feller, Prospectus for the Further
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executive intervention at critical moments in behalf of politically powerful groups or of supposed popular desiressa would
be ever-present. It is not without significance that careful
study of the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission has
led to advocacy of the maintenance unimpaired of the independence of that body.54
It is true that not all of the independent regulatory agencies"
are as fully charged as is the Interstate Commerce Commission
with the duty of promoting the soundness of an essential
industry. There is every reason to believe, however, that the
powers of the younger bodies that are charged with controlling specific industries will inevitably develop to a similar
degree. If the Federal Trade Commission comes to possess,
as it should, full powers in the enforcement of the anti-trust
laws, it will be charged with the most weighty and delicate
duty of all-that of defining the limits of the allowable substitution of management for competition in the control of
trade and industry. 8
As previously noted, the demand of the President's Committee for departmentalization of the independent regulatory
agencies is accompanied by a proposal to segregate their
present "judicial" functions and to entrust them to judicial
sections, which would be "in" the departments only for purposes of "administrative housekeeping."57 By a "relatively
simple" division of work" between such sections and the
departmentalized administrative sections, the judicial functions would not only be left free of departmental control but
Study of Federal Administrative Law (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 647, at
662 if., discussing Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
58
Professor Cushman cites the past attempts at such intervention,
affecting the Interstate Commerce Commission. Op. cit. supra note 7, at
220. Such pressure may also make itself felt through Congress. Robinson, The Hoch-Smith Resolution and the Future of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 610.
542 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 258 if.
55Enumerated note 43 supra.
56
The National Labor Relations Board is in a class by itself. Having
only the duty to apply a statute in cases as they arise, it nevertheless
has many difficult interpretations to make which, in such matters as the
ascertainment of "appropriate" units for collective bargaining, involve
determinations of policy. The Board of Tax Appeals and the legislative
courts perform their adjudicative functions in an atmospbere less filled
with
economic strife.
57
0p. cit. supra note 7, at 41.
8
5 Ibid.
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would be purged of present "insidious" aspects "which threaten
the impartial performance of those functions"; for as it is now,
"the same men are obliged to serve as both prosecutors and
judges." Thus their work is under "suspicion," because of a
condition which "undermines judicial fairness and weakens
public confidence in that fairness."59
The aforesaid "simple" division of work would consist of
assigning to the administrative section the function of making general rules (safety regulations, accounting orders, etc.),
together with those of initiating action in particular cases,
preparing the records in these cases for final decision upon
them and actually deciding such cases as are routine in nature,
subject to appeal to the judicial section.60 The latter, with
cases thus neatly served up to it, "would sit as an impartial,
independent body." Professor Cushman sets forth at greater
length the proposed division of functions. 6 ' But nowhere is
it explained how the decision of a rate case in the Interstate
Commerce Commission or Federal Communications Commission or of a case in the Federal Trade Commission involving
the further specification of what constitutes unfair competition, can become non-policy-determining. If it cannot, the
attempt to segregate the policy-determining from the "judicial"
functions must fail. Nowhere, moreover, is the question
faced of whether the alleged gain in impartiality from segregating the "judicial" functions would not be offset by a loss
in expertness on the part of the deciding body and of efficiency
in the conduct of the regulatory function as a whole.
It is precisely in the expertness which springs from keeping constantly in touch with all aspects of a problem and in
the efficiency of flexible allocation of aspects of that problem
to subordinates as changing conditions arise, that the chief
merits of the independent commissions have lain.62 And it
is the "quasi-judicial method" of accomplishing the "legislative" elaboration of policy case by case, that has resulted in
the realism and fairness of commission decisions.63 That
method defies dismemberment in conformity to concepts,
59ld. at 40.
601bid.
611d. at 230-231.

op. cit. supra note 54, at 58 ff., 269, 365.
63Id. at 255; Eastman, testimony in Hearings Before Select Committee
on Government Organizationon S. 2700, cited supra note 1, at 179.
625 SHARpMAN,
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whether the concepts arise in legal or in political science
thinking.
The bugaboo of the danger which is alleged to lurk in the
supposed combination of "the functions of prosecutor and
judge" in the same individuals is drawn by the President's
Committee from Professor Cushman,"4 who derives it in turn,
at least partially, from the American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Administrative Law.65 The same point is made
elsewhere in the literature of administrative law.68 No one
doubts the pernicious character of the prosecutor-judge combination where it actually exists. But the mere assertion, or
assumption, that administrative regulatory agencies embody
such a combination begs the question. The real question is,
Do they really? It is not one whose answer is self-evident.
A prosecutor is an official set apart to perform the function
of ferreting out suspected crime and presenting the case
against the offender in an adversary proceeding before a
tribunal which is informed of the case only through the trial.
An administrative agency does not ordinarily perform such
a function. Where it deals with an individual in a proceeding
against him, it begins by investigating conduct or conditions
involving possible non-conformity to statutory rules or standards, and it continues its investigation to the end of the
proceeding. More often than not, its process is preventive in
character, looking to future rather than past conditions or
acts. Only rarely is it charged with remedying previous
wrongs. 7 Its efficiency is measured not in terms of convictions but in terms of the successful functioning of the law
that is being administered.
It is true that there are dangers of abuse connected with
this process. An administrative agency may fall victim to
extraneous policies and warp its processes to accomplish
improper ends, such as ridding the country of "reds," or
64Op.

5
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cit. supra note 7, at 230 ff.

0p. cit. supra note 19, at 732.

See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1930);
at 78; works
65.
note
cit.
supra
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cited
in
67The classic example is the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to award reparation to shippers who have been compelled to pay
unreasonable freight charges. Its decisions in this regard, however,
are only prima facie evidence in subsequent court proceedings involving
the same matters.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' POWERS (1932)
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protecting a favored economic interest, or meting out punishment to a business scapegoat whom politicians choose to blame
for a depression. If it does, its investigations cease to be
open-minded inquiries and adversely affected interests have
little chance of a fair hearing. More important perhaps, because more common, is the fact that administrative investigations sometimes proceed, after preliminary inquiry, by the
filing of a complaint against persons thought to be violating
the law, followed by a trial upon the complaint. The purpose
of the complaint is to notify the respondent of the matters
being investigated and to define the scope of the subsequent
inquiry. Certainly the complaint does not in itself commit
the administrative agency to decide the case in accordance
with its allegations or to reach one result rather than another
-to lower rates rather than raise them, to revoke a license
rather than continue it, or to issue a cease-and-desist order
rather than withhold one. Undeniably, however-especially
in view of the fact that the respondent, where he defends an
economic advantage, will defend to the hilt-the trial may
come to be an adversary proceeding, with the deciding body
or its agents vigorously advancing one view of the case. There
may also at times be a disposition toward face-saving on the
part of an agency that has issued a complaint.
Whether unfairness results in the work of administrative
agencies would seem to be wholly a question to be decided by
detailed study of their -operations. It probably would be
found that the health officer who inspects a possibly diseased
animal in order to determine whether it should be destroyed
hardly suffers the danger of partiality by reason of the hypothesis upon which, perhaps, he proceeds. Neither, it would
seem, should a licensing officer or board or a utilities commission in fixing rates, be afflicted with a bias. In the determination of unfair practices the danger probably is greater,
for the matters at issue are partly ethical in nature. Here
the hypothesis in a complaint easily becomes a moral precept
and the respondent a sinner. 8 Occasionally a situation may
arise in which it is fair to say that an administrative body9
in effect combines the functions of prosecutor and judge.6
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924), c. II.
69As has been, pointed out, this situation is, or may be, greatly mitigated where, within a regulatory agency, the function of preparing a
case against a respondent is separated from that of formulating the
68

FEDERAL REGULATORY

AGENCIES

351

But to state that such agencies generally combine these functions is to misunderstand the problem and to prejudge the
issue. It is regrettable that the President's Committee and
the American Bar Association committee have lent their
prestige to an ancient clich6.
One may say the same with regard to all the baggage of
fine-spun separation-of-powers doctrine which the reports here
under discussion drag along as so much dead weight. Not
that the theory of the separation of powers has lost its
validity, for it has not. We need today, as we always have, a
legislature that really determines fundamental policies and
the basic structure of administration; independent courts,
more available than they now are to the citizen who has
suffered a wrong, whether at the-hands of a private party or
of the government"0 ; and an executive that is strong enough
to lead and efficiently equipped for just administration. But
we do not need, and we cannot afford, to deny to Congress
the administrative aid which it requires in developing sound
economic policies and protecting their administration from
possible impairment by short-run political expediency. Neither
can we afford to hamstring administration by a futile insistence upon its dissection into supposedly distinct legislative,
judicial, and administrative processes.71
What is required is a separation of tasks according to the
requirements of efficiency and justice, rather than a separation
of processes. Such a separation can occur both in the government at large and within the several governmental agencies.
To this end economist, political scientist, and lawyer must
co6perate. The contribution of the lawyer will come through
final decision. Bevis, Administrative Decisions and the Administration
of Justice (1918) 2 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 1. It was the failure of the Federal
Trade Commission to maintain such a separation which led to the evils
disclosed in HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 68.
7OThe immunity of the state from tort liability remains an unnecessary injustice in our legal system. Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort (1924-5) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229, (1926-7) 36 id. 1, 757, 1039.
7'All attempts to distinguish the inner, psychological nature of these
processes have failed. We know that the three branches of the government proceed by somewhat different methods, or procedures; that the
exercise of discretion, or policy-determination, is of different degrees of
importance in their respective functioning, and that their acts, on the
whole, assume different forms. That is all we do know and, very
probably, all we ever shall; for mental processes cannot be classified
according to politico-legal concepts. See Akzin, The Concept of Legislation (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 713.
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his understanding of procedure, especially in its incidence
upon private persons and property. It is that incidence which
ought to define the problem of administrative law for the legal
profession, rather than the maintenance of the separation of
powers. Nor would such an approach imply a preoccupation
with private rather than public interest; for -the problem
exists and can be regarded from the governmental as well as
from the private point of view.
The merits of the other issues, previously noted, which are
raised by the committee reports here under review, are
similarly obscure except as they are illuminated by information regarding the actual functioning of specific administrative agencies. There is as yet little evidence that "independent
review" by administrative appeal boards of the decisions,
acts, and failures to act' 2 on the part of administrative agencies
would result in greater efficiency or justice. Some evidence
has been gathered in particular fields,' 3 but not nearly enough
to found an all-inclusive judgment. The course of wisdom and
of true conservatism would seem to lie in limiting the institution of intra-agency boards of review to those fields of administration in which the need for them actually is felt or can
be discovered,74 without unnecessarily imposing75 a cumbersome procedure in other areas. The same conclusion applies
to the jurisdiction that should be given to an administrative
court, if one were to be established. To give it jurisdiction,
as the Brookings report proposes, 8 over all administrative
acts which an individual wished to contest, with complete
review of the facts and the law and with a further appeal to
72Op. cit. supra note 24, at 225.
"See, e.g., VANVLECK, THE ADMINIsTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS
(1932); CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO
EURoPE (1931); REPORT, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931), Part V.

UTo some extent this policy has been followed in the creation of
reviewing boards, to which the American Bar Association committee
and the Brookings Institution both point. Op. cit. supra note 24, at
200-205; op. cit. supra note 27, at 63, 95.
75The Bar Association committee's draft bill, as previously noted,
does not make the creation of such boards mandatory, but the committee's argument clearly calls for their establishment in all those areas
of administration in which aggrieved persons are likely to wish to take
appeals. Op. cit. supra note 24, at 199-200, 203.
7
0p. cit. supra note 27, at 99, 101.
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an upper division of the court, might seriously impair governmental efficiency without adequate justification in present
abuses.
Nor has there been necessity shown for the sweeping proposal of both the Bar Association committee and the Brookings
Institution77 that the enactment of regulations be made mandatory upon bodies that have rule-making powers. The Brookings report suggests further that rule-making be employed
more largely than at present, in preference to the case method,
for the purpose of giving definiteness to the statutory standards which administrative bodies are called upon to apply.
Now of course it has been appreciated at least since the time
of Bentham that definite legislative prescriptions are preferable, from the standpoint of the citizen, to unpredictable,
retroactive judicial legislation. The demand that such prescriptions be employed is legitimate so long as it does not
extend to matters which cannot wisely be treated by this
method. But a broad statutory command that this method
be employed is too crude a weapon to use in the struggle for
certainty in the law. Even where rule-making powers have
been conferred, their wise exercises may have to await the
accumulation of experience in dealing with specific situations
as they arise. And ivhile rule-making powers doubtless should
replace or supplement present decisional powers as to some
matters,78 the Brookings report goes much too far in lightly
asserting that "each authority given a regulatory function
should by rules and regulations so implement the law as to
make it directly applicable" and that, for example, "the
Securities and Exchange Commission should prescribe in detail
what conditions securities must meet in order to be declared
marketable."79 By way of contrast, Professor Sharfman credits
the case method of the Interstate Commerce Commission with
the realism, flexibility, and equity of the policies which that
body has applied in railroad regulation, and he makes no
suggestion that this method can or ought to be supplemented
by increased reliance upon general regulations.8 0
The American Bar Association committee adds extensive
procedural requirements to its recommendation of mandatory
77

See notes 32 and 33 supra.
Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 175, at 259.
0p. cit. supra note 27, at 98.
805 SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra, note 54, at 269, 365 ff.
78
Handler,
79
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administrative rule-making. "Rules and regulations shall not
be issued until after notice and an opportunity for interested
parties to be heard." 8 ' This requirement is to extend to procedural as well as substantive regulations-to those, in fact,
which come under the basic federal statute conferring upon
each department head the authority "to prescribe regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution
and performance of its business, and the custody, use and
preservation of the records, papers and property belonging
to it,"82 as well as to those which come under the more specific
rule-making powers conferred upon particular agencies.83 Nowhere are the "interested parties" defined, to whom notice
and an opportunity to be heard are to be afforded, nor is there
any suggestion of a differentiation of procedure according to
the types of regulations (procedural, interpretative of statutory terms, directory of subordinate officials, and substantive)
that regularly issue from governmental agencies. It is stated,
however, that the proposal applies only to such regulations as
implement statutes "affecting [private] persons or property."8 4
Officials, confronted by so loose a proposal, may well shrink
from the task of attempting to apply it and from the contemplation of the probable length of the hearing dockets they
would be compelled to maintain.
On top of these elaborate procedural requirements, the Bar
Association committee proposes that, in addition to existing
methods of testing the legality of administrative regulations
in court, the Court of Claims, upon petition filed with it and
after the taking of evidence, shall have jurisdiction to annul
such regulations as are found to conflict with the Constitution or with the statutes under which they are issued.85 Although it is suggested that the Court of Claims, by reason of
the performance of its existing functions, is "familiar with a
great deal of Federal law and regulations,""6 no convincing
reason is advanced why that body should be entrusted with
the virtually conclusive determination of many difficult legal
Slop. cit. supra note 24, at 169.
821 STAT. 28 (1789)

5 U. S. C. §22 (1934).

83Op. cit. supra note 24, at 186, 189.
841d. at 224.
851d. at 170, 194, 225.
86I.

at 195.
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and constitutional questions*7 or with the power to delay the
administration of important regulatory measures by adverse
decisions. Moreover, the proposed review would be of a new
type and hence would constitute a vast extension of control
by judicial methods; for while it is true that "the validity of
a regulation may now be raised in any case where the courts
have jurisdiction," 8 it is also true that the attack is almost
always collateral and the court is rarely supplied with an
administrative record upon which to base its review. The
validity of the regulation turns, technically speaking, upon
an issue of law and not one of fact. Hence there is no basis
upon which to justify the reception of evidence in regard to
the question, and the court must assume the existence of circumstances establishing the validity of the regulation, unless
no such circumstances can reasonably be supposed to exist,
or to have existed. 9 The committee's proposal, by contrast,
authorizes the Court of Claims on every appeal to go into the
factual basis of the authority for the contested regulation,
without establishing any presumption or rule of conclusiveness in favor of the pertinent administrative determinations.
The question of the proper procedure in administrative
rule-making is one of which the Supreme Court recently has
taken cognizance.90 Its wise solution will require differentiation of several types of regulations and of many varieties of
situations in which rule-making powers operate.91 The need
for judicial review will require determination in specific fields
of administration. Clearly no such undiscriminating attack
87The statement that the proposal "will serve to bring the approximately million men and women employed in the administrative branch
of the government back under the control of the law" [McGums, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE AND) THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

(1937) 6] implies a definiteness in the law which, at least in constitutional and statutory interpretation, has not been conspicuous of late.
8
0p. cit. supra note 24, at 196.
89
Recent doctrines in regard to judicial trial de novo of facts upon
which issues of administrative jurisdiction or of the constitutional right
of an appellant may turn, conceivably might lead in the future to the
reception of evidence regarding these issues when raised with respect
to general regulations. No decisions to this effect have, however, been
had. See Fuchs, supra note 3, at 564.
9
oPanama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); United States v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 293 U.S. 454 (1935); Pacific States Box &
Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
0
eSee the discussion in Feller, supra note 52, at 667-669.
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upon the problem as the Bar Association committee proposes
can be adequate to the task or productive of benefits.
IV. THE WAY OF PROGRESS
Thus to reject the broad proposals currently advanced for
bringing about improvement in the administration of regulatory laws is not at all to suggest that change is undesirable
or impossible. Improvement must come, and come quickly.92
But it must be genuine improvement, solidly grounded in
actualities and carefully devised to cope with the problems to
be met, rather than a sweeping rearrangement of functions
on the basis of preconceived ideas. The results of decades of
governmental evolution should not be lightly destroyed.
There are hopeful factors in the present situation, both in
the way of reforms accomplished and in the shape of constructive tendencies now at work. The Bar Association Committee on Administrative Law itself contributed worthily to
the movement which resulted in the establishment of the Federal Register,"3 in which administrative regulations must now
be published before going into effect."4 Justice in the collection of income and estate taxes by the United States has been
substantially improved by the establishment of the Board of
Tax Appeals.95 The administration of the deportation laws,
which was filled with abuse, has been cleaned up by administrative action.9 6 Further improvement may be expected as
a result of studies of particular agencies now under way, or
92Fuchs, supra note 3, passim.
93
Report of Special Committee on Administrative Law (1934) 59
A. B. A. REP. at 552-555. See also Griswold, Government in Ignorance
of the Law-A Plea, for Better Publication of Executive Legislation
(1934) 48 HARv. L. REV. 198. Substantial improvement still is needed
in this regard. Not only are the regulations of state agencies largely
unavailable, but the index to the Register serves as the only means of
bringing together the regulations of particular Federal agencies, except
in so far as they are separately published and are not out of print. The
projected Federal Administrative Code, which is now being prepared
pursuant to Public Act 158, 75th Cong. (1937), will be a welcome addition to authoritative legal literature.
9449 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C.A. §§301 if. (Supp. 1938).
9543 STAT. 336 (1924) 26 U.S.C. §600 if. (1934).
960ppenheimer, Recent Developments in the DeportationProcess (1938)
36 MICH. L. REv. 355.
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in consequence of investigations for which the need is distinctly felt.'
Encouraging also is the ability of legislators, at least at
times, to separate the sound and unsound features of proposals such as those here under discussion. The omission or
elimination of harmful provisions from the bills introduced
pursuant to the report of the President's Committee has
already been noted.*8 The hearings upon the report, despite
much useless reiteration of obvious matters, did bring out
the merits of the controversial points. Senator Byrd, the able
if somewhat captious leader of the opposition, exposed the
insubstantial foundations of the Committee's recommendations with regard to the independent establishments. 9 Senator
Byrnes, having wide familiarity with the matters under consideration and no axe to grind, presided with good humor and
with ability to direct discussion to the vital questions. 00 Apparently it is his guidance which has produced the present
bill, whose enactment, if followed by vigorous executive action, 0' in all probability will result in a great advance in the
efficiency of the Federal Government.
97Feller, supra note 52; FIELD, RESEARCH IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(1937).
98Text at note 41 et seq.
99His summary of the contradictions which members of the Committee
had uttered in their testimony (largely because of their confessed unfamiliarity with the actual work of the agencies they were criticizing)
was devastating. Hearings before Select Committee on Government
Organization on S. 2700, supra note 1, at 251-253.
looThe Committee's proposal for the transfer from the Comptroller
General to the Treasury of the functions of pre-auditing expenditures
and administering disbursements was a subject of even more bitter controversy than the proposals with regard to the independent commissions. Upon the former issue as upon the latter, the Senators must
have wearied of the contradictory, dogmatic, and even changing arguments of experts in administrative "science."
The legislators were
confronted with a complete about-face on the part of the Brookings
Institution since the making of certain state studies, in regard to the
proper lodgment of the auditing and disbursing functions. 75th Cong.
1st Sess., Hearings before the Joint Committee on Government Organization (1937) 306 ff.
10oPrevious acts have conferred even broader authority upon the President to reorganize executive agencies, but they have resulted in only
minor changes. 47 Stat. 413, §403 (1932); id. 1518, §403 (1933). They
were enacted, however, largely to obtain economy in expenditures. The
present measure responds to a definite governmental philosophy and contemplates thoroughgoing action in accordance with the report of the
President's Committee. There is reason to believe that greater results
would follow its enactment.
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Thus there is reason to believe that the means of constructing an administrative system that shall be at once more efficient
and more just actually are available and are functioning. The
limiting factor at present is the scarcity of data concerning
the actual conduct of the administrative agencies-a scarcity
which is likely to be mitigated as investigations go forward.
In the meanwhile the general issues that have been raised in
the reports here under review, when critically regarded, serve
to sharpen essential thinking.
Ralph F. Fuchs.
Washington University.

